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1. Introduction
Investigation of how the ownership structure of listed companies in China is 
determined will provide a better understanding of this transitional market economy 
and the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Ownership concentration, 
blockholder characteristics, and the pyramid structure constitute three important 
aspects of the ownership structure of China’s listed companies. Fan, Wong and Zhang 
(2009) study the causes and economic consequences of the pyramid structure, and Xia 
and Chen (2007) examine endogenous determination among the level of government 
control, ownership concentration and modes of government ownership of China’s state-
owned listed companies. Based on these studies, this paper explores how ownership 
concentration and blockholder characteristics are determined in China.
Endogeneity of ownership structure has long been a topic of interest (see, for 
example, Leland and Pyle (1977) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985), among others). As a 
signiﬁcant component of contract structure, and because of its importance in the reform 
of SOEs, ownership structure has been a core concern of academics and practitioners 
in China, with domestic scholars including Zhu and Song (2001), Wang et al. (2001), 
Feng et al. (2002), and Li (2002) among the early researchers of the endogeneity 
problem. Chen et al. (2004) review domestic and foreign papers on ownership structure 
and document that endogeneity is a ‘problem of origin.’ Zheng and Wei (2006) 
point out that whereas Chinese scholars focus mainly on firm performance to study 
the endogeneity of ownership structure, the formation and adjustment of ownership 
structure are not driven by performance alone. They maintain that the interaction 
between control rights and performance should also be taken into consideration. Zheng 
and Wei (2006) argue that the most reasonable approach to investigate the endogeneity 
of ownership structure issue is to check the formation of the ownership structure at 
the time of the IPO, and assert that the formation of the IPO ownership structure 
of listed companies is the result of the choice of the controlling shareholders among 
the types of internal capital markets. Xia and Chen (2007) study the inﬂuence of the 
institutional environment on the ownership structure of listed companies controlled by 
local governments. They investigate neither the possible impacts of the diﬀerent modes 
of local government ownership and micro-level factors of listed companies on ownership 
structure, which may be important, nor the ownership structure of listed private 
companies.
The inﬂuence of the institutional environment on corporate governance structure 
has become a hot research topic at home and abroad. This is closely related to new 
institutional economics, which emphasizes that institutions have decisive impacts on 
contract structure (Coase, 1937; Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; North, 1981). La Porta 
et al. (1998, 1999, and 2000) examine the influence of law and investor protection 
on corporate governance structure, financial policy, and accounting information in 
diﬀerent countries, focusing on the relationship between legal protection and ownership 
concentration. Dyck (2000), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2002), and Boubakri, 
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Cosset and Guedhami (2005) provide cross-country comparative research evidence of 
the relationship between legal protection of investors and ownership concentration, 
which basically supports the hypotheses of La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, and 2000) of the 
relationship between law and ﬁnance. However, these studies conduct only a horizontal 
comparison of the differences in legal protection of investors and contract structure 
among different countries, and do not take into consideration that the institutional 
environments in different regions within a single country can be different. Hence, 
domestic scholars in China, including Xia and Fang (2005), Sun et al. (2005), Xin 
and Xu (2007), Xia and Chen (2007), Luo and Tang (2009), Wang, Wong and Xia 
(2008), and Fan, Wong and Zhang (2009), among others, extend the abovementioned 
research by considering the impact of the regional institutional environment on 
contract structure. On the basis of these studies, this paper explores the relation between 
institutional environment and ownership structure to determine whether the regional 
institutional environment has an impact on the choice of ownership concentration and 
blockholder characteristics among listed companies in China, and if so, how.
Based on the theory of ultimate property rights, Liu, Sun and Liu’s (2003) 
classification of final controllers and Xu, Xin and Chen’s (2006) classification of 
blockholder characteristics, this paper investigates the influence of institutional 
environment variables, namely, marketization, government intervention, and legal 
environment indexes, on blockholder characteristics and ownership concentration, 
and the relation between the endogeneity of ownership structure and institutional 
environment, using the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2001 to 2004. 
The effects of the abovementioned institutional environment variables on ownership 
concentration are (1) positive for listed companies controlled by state asset management 
bureaus aﬃliated with local governments, (2) negative for listed companies controlled 
by SOEs aﬃliated with local governments, and (3) unclear for listed private companies. 
These variables also positively aﬀect the degree of privatization of listed companies. In 
brief, the results show that the regional institutional environment aﬀects the ownership 
concentration and blockholder characteristics of listed companies in China.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining in greater depth the problem of 
the endogeneity of ownership structure, and provides empirical evidence of the relation 
between the endogeneity of ownership structure and the institutional environment. 
First, the classiﬁcation of blockholders is more detailed, and local state asset management 
agencies, local SOEs, and private enterprises are comprehensively studied, building 
on the research of Xia and Chen (2007). Second, after controlling for endogeneity of 
ownership concentration and blockholder characteristics using a simultaneous equation 
model (SEM), this paper examines the impact of the institutional environment on such 
characteristics.
2. Institutional Background, Theoretical Analysis, and Hypotheses
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Liu, Sun and Liu (2003) classify the controlling shareholders of China’s listed 
companies into three categories: directly controlled, indirectly controlled, and not 
controlled by the government. Based on the theory of ultimate property rights, diﬀerent 
intermediate controlling shareholders represent different economic attributes, agent 
monitoring behavior, and professional knowledge. They can be governmental agencies, 
state-owned enterprises or private enterprises. As a result, their motives in controlling 
subordinate companies and economic consequences are significantly different. 
According to the statistical results of Liu, Sun and Liu (2003), in contrast to other 
emerging markets and countries with a transitional economy in which private ownership 
dominates the ownership structure, as of 2001, 84.1% of China’s listed companies were 
ultimately controlled by the government, either directly (8.5%) or indirectly (75.6%) 
through a pyramid structure. On average, the largest shareholder of each listed company 
held approximately 44% of the total shares, which is consistent with the sample 
observations of this paper. To examine what determines the government’s choice of both 
the controlling mode and ownership concentration of listed companies, this section 
carries out a theoretical analysis of the relationships among the regional institutional 
environment, blockholder characteristics, and ownership concentration, under the 
institutional background in China.
2.1. Regional Institutional Environment and Ownership Concentration
In the process of China’s transition from a planned to a market economy, there has 
been a shift from centralization to decentralization of government power, which has 
allowed local governments to gain ﬁnancial and economic autonomy. Shleifer (1998) 
observes that local governments will take advantage of government ownership to pursue 
their political goals, which leads to the unsatisfactory performance of SOEs. Lin, Cai 
and Li (1998) document that one of the main problems of companies in transitional 
economies is that they are committed to carrying out multiple governmental goals, 
including economic development, employment, social endowment and social stability, 
which imposes a policy burden on such companies.
To achieve the abovementioned goals, local governments are motivated to relax their 
control over their subordinate enterprises, which leads to a change in the form of local 
government control and ownership concentration. Therefore, the determination of the 
ownership structure of listed companies controlled by local governments is endogenous 
to the motives of those local governments to control SOEs. In addition, motives are 
affected by the regional institutional environment. According to Fan et al. (2003), 
China’s market-oriented reforms have resulted in decisive progress, but large gaps still 
exist among diﬀerent regions. They propose that the process of marketization be divided 
based on ﬁve aspects: ‘relationship between government and market,’ ‘development of 
non-state-owned economy,’ ‘degree of product market development,’ ‘degree of element 
market development’ and ‘development of market intermediaries and legal environment 
system’. Three institutional variables, the process of marketization (INDEXMAR), 
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relationship between government and the market (INDEXGOV) and development of 
market intermediaries and the legal system (INDEXLAW), are important components 
of the regional institutional environment which aﬀect a local government’s choice and 
adjustment of the ownership structure of the companies under its control. The process 
of marketization and market competition can be substituted for each other to a certain 
extent. Market competition creates a choice between ‘survival’ and ‘death’ for companies. 
In the face of this choice, companies, regardless of the ownership type, have to improve 
their corporate governance and enhance their eﬃciency to survive and develop (Liu and 
Li, 1998). The optimization of ownership concentration is an important way to improve 
corporate governance.
At its formation, China’s securities market was given the important mission of 
helping in the reform of SOEs. As a result, most of the listed companies at that time 
were created through the restructuring of such enterprises. To maintain the dominant 
role of public ownership, state control, either direct or indirect, became a popular 
ownership pattern of these newly listed firms. In general, local governments have 
chosen the mode of direct control (the blockholder is the local state asset management 
bureau) to achieve their political and economic goals, which makes it easier for these 
governments to intervene in the activities of, and gain more benefits from, listed 
companies.
At the same time, because the administrative agent and the power of control over 
SOEs cannot be transferred with a consideration (Zhang, 1998; Du, 2002), there 
is a higher degree of ownership concentration in local-government-controlled listed 
companies. Of course, in regions where the process of marketization is moving more 
quickly, the level of local government intervention in listed companies is lower and 
the legal environment is better. As a result of the inﬂuence of regional privatization, 
local governments, to gain more eﬀective control of listed companies, will also keep a 
higher percentage of ownership in those companies that they directly control to improve 
decision efficiency and reduce decision costs to deal with fierce market competition. 
Accordingly, the concentration of ownership becomes a property rights barrier in the 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity of local SOEs, because in the regions that possess 
a better institutional environment, the market is more developed, and the concentrated 
ownership structure will be helpful in preventing potential threats against the existing 
control power.
Regarding listed companies indirectly controlled by local governments (the 
blockholders are local SOEs), following SOE reform strategies, including ‘decentralization 
of power and transfer of proﬁts’ and ‘seize the big and free the small,’ and considering 
the restriction of political costs, the establishment of local government credit and the 
promotion of government image, local governments are more inclined to compel their 
indirectly controlled listed companies to actively participate in regional product market 
competition. In regions in which the process of marketization is moving more quickly, 
as noted, the level of local government intervention in listed companies is lower and the 
legal environment is better; hence, those listed companies will face more ﬁerce market 
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competition, and their operation and maintenance will require more specialized and 
professional knowledge, which increases the cost of the local governments to intervene 
in the operation of the companies. To some extent, all of these factors reduce the 
motivation of local governments to control SOEs (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). Of 
course, in regions with more intense market competition, more information is available 
to monitor the managers of SOEs, and thus it becomes easier for the government to 
supervise the companies after the relaxation of its control (Lin et al., 1997). The lack of 
incentives to control ﬁrms and the low costs of information collection and government 
supervision motivate those local governments to reduce the percentage of ownership 
in indirectly controlled companies. In support of the foregoing logic and theoretical 
analysis, Fan, Wong and Zhang (2009) ﬁnd that in regions with a lower ﬁscal deﬁcit, 
lower unemployment, a government with more long-term goals, faster marketization 
process and better legal environment, there is a greater hierarchy between companies 
controlled by local government and their ultimate controllers. A potential consequence 
of greater hierarchy in the control chain is the decentralization of the ownership 
structure. They believe that the increase in the hierarchy is an alternative means for the 
separation of power while the transfer of state-owned shares is limited.
Accordingly, it can be expected that in regions with poorer investor protection, 
blockholders are more likely to encroach on the interests of the listed companies. To 
achieve their economic goal, local SOEs are more likely to become involved in related 
party transactions with listed companies through a more concentrated ownership 
structure. In fact, such transactions between listed companies and their controlling 
shareholders are a common phenomenon in China’s securities market, and are an 
important means by which blockholders tunnel listed companies (Li et al., 2004; He and 
Liu, 2005). Poor investor protection often breeds and contributes to the occurrence of 
tunneling. In other words, the regional institutional environment aﬀects the ownership 
structure of listed companies and their economic consequences.
Based on the foregoing theoretical analysis, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are proposed as 
follows:
H1: Ceteris paribus, for listed companies controlled by state asset management bureaus 
aﬃliated with local governments, the better is the regional institutional environment, 
the higher is the blockholder shareholding and the more concentrated is the ownership 
structure.
H2: Ceteris paribus, for listed companies controlled by SOEs affiliated with local 
governments, the better is the regional institutional environment, the lower is the 
blockholder shareholding and the less concentrated is the ownership structure.
Since the reforms and opening up, China’s main task is economic development 
and social stability (the central government also uses these standards to evaluate local 
governments), and the latter is closely related to local economic development. The 
decentralization reforms that were launched in the 1980s led to competition across 
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regions, which triggered the privatization of public enterprises in the 1990s (Zhang and 
Li, 1998). As a result of the intense cross-regional product market competition, every 
region must reduce product costs as much as possible to maintain the minimum market 
share required for survival. The more intense is this competition, the higher is the degree 
of privatization. In regions where the process of marketization is moving more quickly, 
as noted, the level of local government intervention in listed companies is lower and 
the legal environment is better; hence, product market competition and the fight to 
control market power are much ﬁercer. To maintain market superiority in this business 
environment, higher blockholder shareholding and a more concentrated ownership 
structure are required of listed private companies.
The analysis above is only one of the many possible explanations of the ownership 
concentration of listed private companies. The empirical analysis of Zhu (2004) indicates 
that although the increasing competition across regions will surely accelerate the 
privatization process of SOEs in related regions, the wide restructuring of public enterprises 
since the 1990s has not been promoted mainly by interregional competition. Rather, the 
main motivation of local governments to promote privatization is based on two aspects of 
local public ﬁnance: (1) ﬁnancial pressure and diﬃcult budget constraints due to the 1994 
tax-sharing reform; and (2) the development of non-state-owned entities and the increase 
in the proportion of such entities, signiﬁcantly improving local public ﬁnance. Therefore, 
in regions where the process of marketization is moving more quickly, non-state-owned 
companies are developing more rapidly and make up a greater proportion of businesses. 
In these regions, the pressure on public ﬁnance is lower, so the degree of local government 
intervention in privately owned enterprises is lower and the degree of private property 
protection is higher. All of these factors lead to lower ownership concentration.
Chen, Li and Su (2005) conduct research into the causes and consequences of 
the political connections established by listed private companies. They find that in 
regions with more serious fiscal deficits and arbitrary government actions, which are 
characteristics of a poor institutional environment, companies tend to establish political 
connections. Those that have done so often adopt centralized ownership and board 
structures. In these regions, ownership structure is more concentrated, which contrasts 
the previous view that the better is the regional institutional environment, the higher is 
the degree of ownership concentration.
Based on the foregoing discussion of the two competing theories of how the regional 
institutional environment aﬀects the ownership structure of listed private companies, we 
propose Hypotheses 3a and 3b as follows:
H3a: Ceteris paribus, for listed private companies, the better is the regional institutional 
environment, the higher is the blockholder shareholding and the more concentrated is the 
ownership structure.
H3b: Ceteris paribus, for listed private companies, the better is the regional institutional 
environment, the lower is the blockholder shareholding and the less concentrated is the 
ownership structure.
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2.2. Regional Institutional Environment and the Privatization of Listed Companies
The economic motives and actions of local governments to control SOEs have 
changed since decentralization in the 1980s as well as the public ﬁnance reforms and 
increase in market competition across regions in the 1990s.
China’s economic reforms since 1979 can be seen as the reallocation of the power 
of control and the rights to share in economic residuals from the central government to 
local governments, and from local governments to managers of enterprises. The former 
process can be considered decentralization and the latter deregulation (Zhang and Li, 
1998). Some Chinese scholars also call the former administrative decentralization and 
the latter economic decentralization. The development of the public ﬁnance and taxation 
systems since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can be roughly 
divided into three stages: (1) before 1978, a centralized fiscal system with unified 
revenue and expenditure; (2) from 1978 to 1993, gradual decentralization of power 
and the development of a system of revenue sharing and contracted ﬁnance1; and (3) in 
1994, tax-sharing reform (Zhang and Gong, 2005). Under the new tax system, all taxes 
are divided into central government, local government and shared taxes. State and local 
taxation bureaus are established to levy taxes separately. In this way, the administrative 
authority of the central and local governments and the scope of their expenditures are 
determined. Since the 1994 tax-sharing reform, the central government’s ﬁscal revenue 
as a percentage of GNP has increased and the pattern of revenue received by the central 
and local governments has been reversed. More ﬁscal revenue is now in the hands of 
the central government. However, the pattern of expenditure by the central and local 
governments has not changed much. Although more ﬁscal revenue is directed to the 
central government, the burden of ﬁnancial expenditure is still left to local governments 
(Yin et al., 2006). Thus, local governments have the incentive to pursue more fiscal 
revenue. The decentralization policy enables local government oﬃcials to control the 
local economy, establish new enterprises and use self-raised funds to make investments, 
among other activities. More importantly, the power to manage and restructure 
local enterprises allows them to share in the residual claims of those enterprises and 
participate in their management. This institutional arrangement further motivates local 
governments to pursue more fiscal revenue, and triggers competition among them, 
which contributes to the marketization of the whole economy. The Chinese experience 
1 China’s local decentralization policies include the ﬁscal contract system and transference of the supervision of 
SOEs to local governments. The former was established in the 1980s and continued until 1993. Under this 
system, a lower-level government had to remit a ﬁxed amount or proportion of its revenue to the higher-level 
government, and the rest could be used at the discretion of the local government. This system ended the history 
of arbitrary transfer payments among governments of diﬀerent levels and diﬀerent regions. Most SOEs were 
owned by local governments until the end of 1983, and up to 1994, local government on all levels controlled 
65% of the total assets of these enterprises (China Reform Foundation, 1997).
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shows that the ‘invisible hand’ not only is very eﬀective in the allocation of resources but 
also plays a role in the creation of institutions. Following on decentralization, market 
competition has led to the self-reinforcing process of privatization (Zhang and Li, 1998).
One of the costs China has paid for its economic reforms and opening up is the ever-
increasing gap between incomes. The gap between urban and rural incomes and that 
between regional incomes constitute the most important disparity, and continues to 
grow (Lu and Chen, 2004). Traced to their source, these income gaps, to some extent, 
are related to the economic decentralization reform discussed above. The various Chinese 
regions are very diﬀerent in their historical and geographical conditions and policies.
Regarding interregional competition, because of their relatively advantageous 
conditions, the eastern regions have achieved relatively better economic development. 
This advantage is self-reinforcing. Once the more developed regions have obtained 
a superior position, it is difficult for less developed regions to catch up with them 
(Wang et al., 2007). In an empirical study, Zhang and Gong (2005) find that fiscal 
decentralization positively influences economic growth in the eastern and the more 
developed regions whereas its influence on economic growth in the central and 
western regions is insigniﬁcant or even negative. This diﬀerence in the eﬀects of ﬁscal 
decentralization among various regions widens the gaps among them. In addition, the 
degree of privatization is higher in the coastal than in the inland regions because the 
transaction costs of the former are lower (which promotes interregional competition) 
and more importantly, they have greater autonomy than the latter. Similarly, the degree 
of privatization in the northeast and southwest regions is lower because the dominant 
number of SOEs in these regions suppresses competition and there are fewer private 
enterprises in adjacent areas (Zhang and Li, 1998).
Economic decentralization under political centralization provides local governments 
with the motivation to develop their economies, promote marketization at the local 
level, and facilitate privatization in competitive ﬁelds. However, the relative performance 
evaluation that is endogenous to this incentive structure causes some problems, 
including the growing income gap between urban and rural areas and among regions, 
market segmentation among regions and loss of equity in public utilities (Wang et al., 
2007). A direct economic consequence of the economic decentralization policy is that in 
the eastern coastal regions or regions with a better institutional environment, the degree 
of privatization is higher and the possibility is greater that the blockholders of listed 
companies are private enterprises. In the central and western regions or regions with a 
poorer institutional environment, the possibility is greater that the blockholders of listed 
companies are SOEs.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we propose the following hypothesis on the 
relationship between the regional institutional environment and the blockholder 
characteristics of listed companies:
H4: Ceteris paribus, the better is the regional institutional environment, the higher is the 
degree of privatization of listed companies.
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3. Research Design
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Source
3.1.1. Sample Selection
The sample selection process is as follows:
(1) Financial companies are excluded because of the special nature of the ﬁnancial 
industry;
(2) Companies that issue B or H shares at the same time are excluded because they 
are subject to both domestic and overseas regulations, in contrast to those companies 
that issue only A shares, and also because this will facilitate the calculation of the value 
of the sample companies;
 (3) IPO companies are excluded in order to calculate the market risk and control for 
the inﬂuence of the window dressing of ﬁnancial data in the year of the IPO;
(4) Companies for which data, such as the ultimate controller and blockholder 
characteristics, are missing are excluded; and
(5) For the purpose of this research, the paper examines only listed companies that 
are controlled by state asset management bureaus affiliated with local governments, 
SOEs aﬃliated with local governments or private enterprises. All other companies are 
excluded.
The research period is from 2001 to 2004 for the following reasons:
(1) In China, listed companies provided information about the ultimate controller 
from 2001, and this study concerns the ultimate controller;
(2) We can control for the influence of the accounting performance of listed 
companies because of the implementation of the Accounting Regulations for Business 
and Enterprise from 2001;
(3) Non-tradable share reform was launched on April 29th, 2005. This mandatory 
institutional change has resulted in signiﬁcant changes in the ownership structure of 
listed companies. Therefore, we do not take into account samples after 2005;
(4) The approval system for IPOs was adopted in 2001, and we need to control for 
the possible inﬂuence of the share issuance system on the ownership structure of listed 
companies; and
(5) The NERI Index of the Marketization of China’s Provinces: 2006 Report (Fan, Wang 
and Zhu, 2007) provides the only marketization index of the various regions in China 
from 2001 to 2005. The base period for the computation of the index is 2001, and thus 
the data for the ﬁve years are comparable.
We then delete the top and bottom 1% of each continuous variable to exclude the 
eﬀects of outliers. In total, we have 2,643 ﬁrm-year observations for the three types of 
blockholders: 192 where blockholders are state asset management bureaus aﬃliated with 
local governments, 1,905 where they are SOEs aﬃliated with local governments and 
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546 where they are private enterprises. Table 1 shows the composition of the sample. 
The percentages of the sample companies controlled by state asset management bureaus 
or SOEs affiliated with local governments decrease whereas the percentage of those 
controlled by private companies increases during the sample period, with the progress 
in the reform of the property rights system. The percentage of sample companies in 
regulated industries does not change signiﬁcantly over the sample period.
 
3.1.2. Data Sources
Ownership structure and ﬁnancial data are taken from the Wind system, and the data 
about ultimate controller, industry and registration region are taken from the CCER 
system. We check the data from one source against those from the other, especially the 
data about the industries in which the listed companies are engaged, and whether the 
registration region changes. In addition, we do one-by-one adjustment to the samples 
when the blockholders are different from the ultimate controllers by examining the 
‘Changes in Ownership and Information about Shareholders’ section in their annual 
reports. The annual reports are taken from the Wind system or Juchao information 
network, which is an information disclosure website designated by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CRSC).
The institutional environment data are taken from the NERI Index of the 
Marketization of China’s Provinces: 2006 Report (Fan, Wang and Zhu, 2007). The 
report divides the process of marketization based on ﬁve aspects: ‘relationship between 
government and market,’ ‘development of non-state-owned economy,’ ‘degree of product 
Table 1. Composition of the Sample
2001-2004 2001 2002 2003 2004
Firm no. Percent Firm no. Percent Firm no. Percent Firm no. Percent Firm no. Percent
Blockholder type:
LCSAMBs 192 7.26% 61 10.27% 51 7.81% 43 6.27% 37 5.21%
LCSOEs 1905 72.08% 460 77.44% 489 74.89% 487 70.99% 469 66.06%
Private Companies 546 20.66% 73 12.29% 113 17.30% 156 22.74% 204 28.73%
Total Sample 2643 100% 594 100% 653 100% 686 100% 710 100%
Industry type:
Regulated 936 35.41% 208 35.02% 227 34.76% 244 35.57% 257 36.20%
Non-regulated 1707 64.59% 386 64.98% 426 65.24% 442 64.43% 453 63.80%
Total Sample 2643 100% 594 100% 653 100% 686 100% 710 100%
Note: LCSAMBs refers to the state asset management bureaus aﬃliated with local governments; LCSOEs refers to the 
SOEs aﬃliated with local governments.
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market development,’ ‘degree of element market development’ and ‘development 
of market intermediaries and legal environment system.’ The marketization index is 
obtained using principal component analysis based on these aspects. Following previous 
researchers (Sun et al., 2005; Xia and Fang, 2005; Fang, 2006; Xia and Chen, 2007; 
Lei and Liu, 2007; Xin and Xu, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2009), we use the 
marketization, government intervention and legal environment indexes provided by Fan 
et al. (2007) as proxy variables of the institutional environment. As these indexes are 
relatively stable for various regions and all years, other studies that adopt this approach 
usually use the index of the base period. To improve the accuracy of our results, we use 
the index of each year, and also perform robustness tests using the method adopted by 
other researchers.
3.2. Model and Variable Design
Based on the foregoing analysis, this paper uses the following multiple regression 
model:
OWNERCON = ß0 + ß1INDEX + ß2TOBINQ + ß3ROA + ß4LEV + ß5LNASS (1)
+ß6BETA + ß7INCRE + ß8YEAR02 + ß9YEAR03  + ß10YEAR04 + ß11INREGU + ε 
.
Model (1) is a single regression equation, and its main purpose is to examine how 
the institutional environment influences the three types of ownership concentration 
in listed companies. OWNERCON is a continuous variable, and therefore we use 
the OLS regression. We use Newey-West adjustment to control autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity.
PRIVAT = ß0 + ß1OWNERCON + ß2INDEX + ß3EAST + ß4LNASS (2)
+ß5YEAR02 + ß6YEAR03 + ß7YEAR04+ß8INREGU + ε 
.
OWNERCON = ß0 + ß1PRIVAT + ß2INDEX + ß3TOBINQ + ß4ROA + ß5LEV       (3)
+ ß6LNASS + ß7BETA + ß8INCRE + ß9YEAR02 + ß10YEAR03 + ß11YEAR04 + ß12INREGU + ε 
.
Models (2) and (3) constitute a simultaneous equation model (SEM) of ownership 
concentration and blockholder characteristics. Our purpose is to examine whether the 
institutional environment inﬂuences blockholder characteristics, taking into account the 
endogeneity between such characteristics and ownership concentration. Because PRIVAT 
(blockholder characteristics) is a dummy variable, we use binary probit regression 
analysis in Model (2) and use Huber-White adjustment to control heteroskedasticity. 
The deﬁnitions of all variables are given in Table 2. It should be noted that there are 
two ways to run SEM regression: the single-equation and system estimation methods. 
Based on the characteristics of Models (2) and (3), we use the former, speciﬁcally, the 
two-stage estimation method. The instrument variable (IV) of PRIVAT is the dummy 
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variable EAST and the IVs of the dependent variable OWNERCON are TOBINQ and 
ROA. Among all coefficients, ß0 is the intercept, ß1 to ß12 are the coefficients of the 
independent variables and ε is the residual error.
Table 2. Deﬁnitions of the Main Variables
Variables Deﬁnition
 OWNERCON
Ownership concentration of listed companies. LSHARE1 is the logarithm-transformed 
percentage of the largest shareholder, SHARE1; LHHI5 is the logarithm-transformed sum of 
squares of the percentage of top ﬁve shareholders, HHI5 (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
 PRIVAT
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the blockholder is a private company, and 0 otherwise. 
According to this research, there are three types of blockholders: state asset management 
bureaus aﬃliated with local governments, LCSAMBs; SOEs aﬃliated with local governments, 
LCSOEs; and private companies, PRIVAT.
 INDEX
Institutional environment of listed companies. INDEXMAR is the marketization index of the 
registration region of the listed companies – the higher is the index, the higher is the degree of 
marketization; INDEXGOV is the government intervention index – the higher is the index, the 
lower is the degree of government intervention; INDEXLAW is the legal environment index – 
the higher is the index, the more developed is the legal system; it can measure the eﬀectiveness 
of legal enforcement in diﬀerent regions; and INSFACTOR is attained by principal component 
analysis of INDEXMAR, INDEXGOV, and INDEXLAW.
 EAST
A dummy variable to measure the east regions in China, which can be used to control for the 
inﬂuence of regional factors on the degree of privatization. According to Fan et al. (2003), 
the east regions include Guangdong, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangsu, Shandong, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Hainan, Liaoning, and Hebei. The value of EAST is 1 if the registration region of a 
listed company is one of the above, and 0 otherwise.
 TOBINQ
The formula for the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost is as follows: market 
value/replacement cost = (market price per share × tradable shares + book value per share × non-
tradable shares + total liabilities)/total assets. All variables are ﬁscal year-end data.
 ROA
The ratio of current net income to year-end total assets is used to control for the inﬂuence of 
the accounting performance measure on ownership concentration (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Feng et al., 2002; Li, 2002; Zheng et al., 2006).
 LEV
The ratio of total liabilities to total assets is used to control for the potential inﬂuence of 
capital structure on ownership concentration. Previous research shows that capital structure is 
negatively correlated with ownership concentration (Harvey, Lins and Roper, 2004).
 LNASS
Logarithm-transformed total assets of listed companies are used to control for the inﬂuence of 
ﬁrm size on ownership concentration (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Feng et al., 2002; Li, 2002; 
Zheng et al., 2006). It is also used to examine how the ‘seize the big and free the small’ policy 
inﬂuences ownership concentration (Xia and Chen, 2007).
 BETA
Beta coeﬃcient of the market risk of listed companies, ie, the weekly Beta coeﬃcient of sample 
ﬁrms is used to control for the inﬂuence of the market risk of listed companies themselves on 
ownership concentration (Li, 2002; Cao et al., 2007).
 INCRE The growth rate of the total assets of listed companies is used to control for the potential inﬂuence of ﬁrm growth on ownership concentration.
 YEAR Year dummy variables: YEAR02, YEAR03 and YEAR04.
 INREGU
Regulatory industry dummy variable. Its value is 1 if a listed company is in a regulated industry, 
and 0 otherwise. It is used to control for the inﬂuence of industrial factors on ownership 
concentration and to examine the inﬂuence of the strategy adjustment of SOE reform on 
ownership concentration (Xia and Chen, 2007). Regulated industries include: Mining (B), 
Petroleum, Chemistry and Plastics (C4), Metal and Non-metal (C6), Electricity, Gas and 
Water Production and Supply (D), Transportation and Warehousing (F), and Information 
Technology (G). Our classiﬁcation follows the Guidelines on Industry Classiﬁcation of Listed 
Companies issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2001.
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3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables. The mean (median) of 
SHARE1 is 0.436 (0.432), and the mean (median) of HHI5 is 0.235 (0.208), which 
shows that blockholder shareholding is high and ownership structure is concentrated. 
The maximum, minimum, standard error and discrete degree of the legal environment 
index, INDEXLAW, are greater than those of the marketization index, INDEXMAR, 
and government intervention index, INDEXGOV, which means that there is a huge 
difference in the legal environment index among the regions. The maximum and 
minimum of these three indexes represent the obvious differences in institutional 
environment between the coastal regions in the east and the undeveloped regions in 
the west. From the descriptive statistics of TOBINQ, ROA, LEV, LNASS, BETA, and 
INCRE, we can see that there are also huge diﬀerences among diﬀerent listed companies.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables
Variable Firm No. Mean Median S.D. Minimum Maximum
SHARE1 2643 0.436 0.432 0.165 0.127 0.758
HHI5 2643 0.235 0.208 0.138 0.019 0.576
INDEXMAR 2643 6.207 5.990 1.956 0.330 9.810
INDEXGOV 2643 7.201 7.490 1.566 -1.140 9.850
INDEXLAW 2643 5.033 4.070 2.555 1.150 12.150
TOBINQ 2643 1.358 1.260 0.345 0.954 3.265
ROA 2643 0.020 0.025 0.049 -0.286 0.125
LEV 2643 0.477 0.481 0.167 0.092 0.906
LNASS 2643 21.059 21.015 0.732 19.121 23.094
BETA 2643 1.042 1.052 0.285 0.138 1.746
INCRE 2643 0.130 0.091 0.204 -0.341 1.126
INREGU 2643 0.354 0 0.478 0 1
As Table 4 (correlation analysis) shows, the institutional environment variables 
INDEXMAR, INDEXGOV, and INDEXLAW are negatively correlated with LSHARE1 
and LHHI5 at the 1% level. For INDEXMAR, INDEXGOV, and INDEXLAW, each 
pair is highly positively correlated. This is mainly inﬂuenced by geographic location. In 
regions where the process of marketization is faster, the government intervention and 
legal environment indexes are also higher. This means that to control multicollinearity, 
these three variables should be examined separately in regression analysis. LSHARE1 
and LHHI5 are negatively correlated with TOBINQ and LEV at the 1% level, positively 
correlated with ROA and LNASS at the 1% level, but do not have a stable correlation 
with either BETA or INCRE. They are positively correlated with INREGU at the 1% 
level, which means that industry type is an important variable for ownership structure 
research.
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4. Empirical Results and Analysis
4.1. Multiple Regression Analysis of Institutional Environment and Ownership 
Concentration
Tables 5, 6, and 7 show the results of multiple regression analysis, using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) regression of local state asset 
management agencies, local state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, respectively, 
and report the influence of the institutional environment variables INDEXMAR, 
INDEXGOV, INDEXLAW, and INSFACTOR on ownership concentration. The 
marketization process and local government intervention and local legal protection 
levels all aﬀect the selection of the ownership structure of listed companies. However, 
the choice of governance structure of listed companies may also affect the economic 
behavior of local governments when they are trying to improve the regional institutional 
environment. To reduce the endogeneity problem of regional institutional environment 
variables, this paper borrows the research idea of Fan et al. (2009) and the method 
of Xia and Chen (2007), and uses the following dummy variable as the instrumental 
variable of regional institutional environment: if a listed company is registered in Dalian, 
Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, 
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Beihai, Yingkou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou, Xiamen, or Hainan, then the value is 1; otherwise, it is 0. These regions took 
the lead in China’s opening up, which has resulted in their having a better institutional 
environment than those of other areas. In contrast, the geographic location of listed 
companies does not directly aﬀect their ownership structure.
4.4.1. Test of Hypothesis 1
Table 5 shows the multiple regression results of listed companies, the blockholders of 
which are state asset management bureaus aﬃliated with local governments. It also shows 
the influence of the institutional environment variables INDEXMAR, INDEXGOV, 
INDEXLAW, and INSFACTOR on the two variables of ownership concentration, 
LSHARE1 and LHHI5.
The results of the OLS regression are given in Panels A-D of the table. When 
the dependent variables are LSHARE1 and LHHI5: the regression coefficients of 
INDEXMAR are 0.067 and 0.047, respectively, and whereas the former coeﬃcient is 
signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% level, the latter one is positive but not signiﬁcant (Panel 
A); the regression coefficients of INDEXGOV are 0.154 and 0.135, and significantly 
positive at the 1% and 5% level, respectively (Panel B); the regression coeﬃcients of 
INDEXLAW are 0.046 and 0.038, respectively, and whereas the former coeﬃcient is 
signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level, the latter one is positive but not signiﬁcant (Panel C); 
and the regression coeﬃcients of INSFACTOR are 0.161 and 0.130, and signiﬁcantly 
positive at the 1% and 5% level, respectively (Panel D).
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The results of the IV regression (after controlling for endogeneity) are also given 
in the table. When the dependent variables are LSHARE1 and LHHI5: the regression 
coefficients of INDEXMAR are 0.224 and 0.277, respectively (Panel A); those of 
INDEXGOV are 0.452 and 0.560, respectively (Panel B); those of INDEXLAW are 
0.152 and 0.189, respectively (Panel C); and those of INSFACTOR are 0.442 and 0.547, 
respectively (Panel D). All of these regression coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly positive at the 
1% level.
These regression results indicate that even if the endogeneity problem related to the 
institutional environment is considered, the inﬂuence of the institutional environment 
on ownership concentration still exists, as indicated by the significance level of the 
regression coeﬃcients, R-squared2 and signiﬁcance level of the regression model. The 
research findings presented in Table 5 indicate that when the blockholders of listed 
companies are state asset management bureaus affiliated with local governments, in 
regions where the process of marketization is moving more quickly, the degree of local 
government intervention is lower and the degree of local legal protection is higher, 
blockholder shareholding is higher and ownership structure is more concentrated. 
Hence, Hypothesis1 is supported.
In addition, the financial characteristic variables TOBINQ, LNASS, BETA and 
INCRE have different impacts on the degree of ownership concentration, and the 
impacts of ROA and LEV on ownership concentration are insigniﬁcant; the regression 
coefficients of the annual dummy variables YEAR02, YEAR03 and YEAR04 show a 
significant decreasing trend, which to some extent reflects the influence of the local 
SOE reform strategy, namely, the decentralization of power and transfer of proﬁts, on 
ownership concentration. The regression coeﬃcient of the regulated industry dummy 
variable INREGU is negative but not signiﬁcant, which means that to a certain extent 
the ownership concentration of these kinds of listed companies is less affected by 
industry characteristics.
2 The regression results of Table 5 show that using the instrumental variable method, the regression model’s 
coefficient of determination increases. This means that to a certain extent, geographical location is the 
more explanatory instrumental variable for listed companies the blockholders of which are local state asset 
management agencies. However, this paper does not give a convincing explanation, as the anonymous reviewer 
notes.
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4.1.2. Test of Hypothesis 2
Table 6 shows the multiple regression results of listed companies, the blockholders 
of which are SOEs aﬃliated with local governments, and reports the inﬂuence of the 
institutional environment variables INDEXMAR, INDEXGOV, INDEXLAW, and 
INSFACTOR on the two variables of ownership concentration, LSHARE1 and LHHI5.
The results of the OLS regression are given in Panels A-D of Table 6. When 
the dependent variables are LSHARE1 and LHHI5: the regression coefficients of 
INDEXMAR are -0.034 and -0.039 respectively (Panel A); those of INDEXGOV are 
-0.035 and -0.040 respectively (Panel B); those of INDEXLAW are -0.024 and -0.028 
respectively (Panel C); and those of INSFACTOR are -0.068 and -0.077 respectively 
(Panel D). All of these regression coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level.
The results of the IV regression are also given in the table. When the dependent 
variables are LSHARE1 and LHHI5: the regression coefficients of INDEXMAR are 
-0.046 and -0.052 respectively (Panel A); those of INDEXGOV are -0.092 and -0.105 
respectively (Panel B); those of INDEXLAW are -0.030 and -0.035 respectively (Panel 
C); and those of INSFACTOR are -0.090 and -0.102 respectively (Panel D). All of these 
regression coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level.
These regression results indicate that even if the endogeneity problem relating to the 
institutional environment is considered, the inﬂuence of the institutional environment 
on ownership concentration still exists. In view of the signiﬁcance level of the regression 
coefficients, R-squared and significance level of the regression model, the results are 
consistent with the situation where the endogeneity problem is not considered. The 
research findings presented in Table 6 indicate that when the blockholders of listed 
companies are state-owned enterprises aﬃliated with local governments, in regions where 
the process of marketization is moving more quickly, the degree of local government 
intervention is lower and the degree of local legal protection is higher, blockholder 
shareholding is lower and ownership structure is less concentrated. Hence, Hypothesis 2 
is supported.
In addition, the financial characteristic variables TOBINQ, LNASS, BETA, ROA, 
and LEV all have certain impacts on the degree of ownership concentration, whereas the 
impact of INCRE on ownership concentration is insigniﬁcant; the regression coeﬃcients 
of the annual dummy variables YEAR02, YEAR03, and YEAR04 show a significant 
decreasing trend under the inﬂuence of the local SOE reform strategy of decentralization 
of power and transfer of profits, which is in substantial agreement with the findings 
in Table 5; and the regression coefficient of the regulated industry dummy variable 
INREGU is significantly positive at the 1% level, which means that the ownership 
concentration of these kinds of listed companies is aﬀected by industry characteristics.
Comparing the regression results of LNASS and INREGU in Table 5 with those in 
Table 6, we find that when the blockholders are state asset management agencies or 
SOEs aﬃliated with local governments, the SOE reform policies ‘seize the big and free 
the small’ and ‘allocation of administrative power between central and local governments 
XINGQIANG DU AND ZONGFENG XIU46
and sharing the proﬁts’ have diﬀerent impacts on the corporate governance structure of 
the listed companies under the diﬀerent local government control modes. In the former 
mode, companies are directly controlled by the local government, and the regression 
coeﬃcients of LNASS and INREGU are both negative, whereas in the latter, companies 
are indirectly controlled by the local government, and the regression coefficients of 
LNASS and INREGU are both positive. These ﬁndings complement and expand those of 
Xia and Chen (2007) regarding the ‘process of marketization, the strategy of state-owned 
enterprise reform and the government’s shareholding.’
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4.1.3. Test of Hypothesis 3
Table 7 shows the multiple regression results of listed companies, the blockholders of 
which are private enterprises, and reports the inﬂuence of the institutional environment 
variables INDEXMAR, INDEXGOV, INDEXLAW and INSFACTOR on the two 
variables of ownership concentration, LSHARE1 and LHHI5.
The results of the OLS regression are given in Panels A-D of the table. When 
the dependent variables are LSHARE1 and LHHI5, the regression coefficients of 
INDEXMAR are 0.018 and 0.010 respectively, and whereas the former coefficient is 
signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% level, the latter one is positive but not signiﬁcant (Panel 
A); the regression coefficients of INDEXGOV are 0.024 and 0.011 respectively, and 
whereas the former coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level, the latter one is 
positive but not signiﬁcant (Panel B); the regression coeﬃcients of INDEXLAW are 0.018 
and 0.017 respectively, and whereas the former one is signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% 
level, the latter is positive but not signiﬁcant (Panel C); and the regression coeﬃcients 
of INSFACTOR are 0.044 and 0.030 respectively, and whereas the former one is 
signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% level, the latter is positive but not signiﬁcant (Panel D).
The results of the IV regression are also given in the table. When the dependent 
variables are LSHARE1 and LHHI5, the regression coefficients of INDEXMAR are 
-0.026 and -0.054 respectively (Panel A); those of INDEXGOV are -0.037 and -0.077 
respectively (Panel B); those of INDEXLAW are -0.018 and -0.039 respectively (Panel C); 
and those of INSFACTOR are -0.048 and -0.100 respectively (Panel D). None of these 
regression coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant.
These regression results show that when the dependent variable is LSHARE1, if 
endogeneity is not controlled, then the impact of the institutional environment on listed 
companies, the blockholders of which are private companies is significantly positive. 
However, it is negative but not signiﬁcant after endogeneity is controlled. When the 
dependent variable is LHHI5, if endogeneity is not controlled, then the impact of the 
institutional environment on listed companies, the blockholders of which are private 
companies is positive but not significant. However, it is negative but not significant 
after endogeneity is controlled. Therefore, we can infer that the impact of institutional 
environment on these listed companies is related to the endogeneity of the regional 
institutional environment. Possible reasons include the following:
(1) Hypothesis 3 involves two competing theories—when the regional institutional 
environment is better, listed companies often choose a more concentrated ownership 
structure when the product market competition and the fight for control power are 
taken into account. However, after considering political connections and level of 
economic development, when the regional institutional environment is better, listed 
companies usually do not choose a concentrated ownership structure. These two factors 
interact with each other, and thus may aﬀect the signiﬁcance of the regression coeﬃcient 
of institutional environment to ownership concentration. Nevertheless, judging from 
the direction and relative signiﬁcance level of the regression coeﬃcients in this paper, the 
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theory of Chen, Li and Su (2005) seems to have more explanatory power than that of 
Zhang and Li (1998). This provides insights for further study of the determining factors 
of the ownership structure of listed private companies.
(2) In contrast to state-owned enterprises, which are controlled by various levels 
of government, private companies do not bear policy burdens, assume less historical 
liability and are subject to less local government intervention. Hence, changes in the 
regional institutional environment will not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on their choice 
of ownership concentration. The important factor that determines their ownership 
structure may be the needs of the listed private companies themselves. For example, 
the choice of private companies as controlling shareholders of the internal capital 
market style (this will aﬀect the formation of ownership concentration at the time of 
the IPO (Zheng and Wei, 2006)) and actions of the ultimate controllers in pursuing 
maximum private interest through the power of control are more direct factors than is 
the regional institutional environment in aﬀecting the choice of listed private companies 
of ownership concentration. This may provide one clue for further study of the 
phenomenon of tunneling or beneﬁts transfer in private companies.
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4.2. Multiple Regression Test of Institutional Environment and Privatization of 
Listed Companies: Test of Hypothesis 4
The main purpose of the simultaneous equation model of ownership concentration and 
blockholder characteristics in Models 2 and 3 is to study whether the regional institutional 
environment affects the blockholder characteristics of listed companies after the 
endogeneity between such characteristics and ownership concentration has been taken into 
account. Table 8 gives the multiple regression results of how the institutional environment 
affects these characteristics and reports the separate influence of the institutional 
environment variables INDEXMAR and INSFACTOR on blockholder characteristics 
under the probit model and SEM, respectively. The test of the endogeneity of ownership 
concentration has been reported in the previous section and so we do not report here the 
regression results of SEM (3) when the dependent variables are LSHARE1 and LHHI5.
In Table 8, the dependent variable of the regression model is PRIVAT. In the probit 
model, when the variables are LSHARE1 and LHHI5: the regression coefficients of 
INDEXMAR are 0.049 and 0.048 respectively, and both are signiﬁcant at the 10% level; 
and the regression coeﬃcients of INSFACTOR are 0.073 and 0.072 respectively, but 
both are insigniﬁcant. In the SEM, when the variables are LSHARE1 and LHHI5: the 
regression coeﬃcients of INDEXMAR are 0.052 and 0.052 respectively, and both are 
signiﬁcant at the 10% level; and the regression coeﬃcients of INSFACTOR are 0.073 
and 0.074 respectively, and both are signiﬁcant at the 15% level. These regression results 
indicate that in regions with a better institutional environment, China’s listed companies 
are more likely to be private enterprises. Hence, Hypothesis 4 is supported. The results 
using the IPO sample (Table 9) also support this hypothesis.
The regression coeﬃcients of the ownership concentration variables LSHARE1 and 
LHHI5 are all signiﬁcantly negative for both the probit model and SEM. This indicates 
a systematic diﬀerence in the ownership concentration between listed private and listed 
local state-owned companies. The regression coefficient of the eastern area dummy 
variable, EAST, is insigniﬁcant, which is mainly caused by the multicollinearity between 
EAST and INDEXMAR and INSFACTOR. The single regression result of EAST and 
the dependent variable PRIVAT is signiﬁcantly positive; therefore, EAST remains as an 
eﬀective instrumental variable of PRIVAT. The corporate size variable, LNASS is always 
signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, which means there are systematic diﬀerences in 
size between listed private and listed local state-owned companies. This is mainly due to 
the reform policy of ‘seize the big and free the small.’ The regression coeﬃcients of the 
regulated industry dummy variable, INREGU are signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, 
but they are insigniﬁcant in the SEM. One possible reason is that among the estimates 
in the second phase of the SEM, LSHARE1 and LHHI5 include most of the inﬂuence of 
regulated industry. The regression coeﬃcients of the annual dummy variables YEAR02, 
YEAR03 and YEAR04 show a signiﬁcant increasing trend. As SOEs are restructured and 
listed, private enterprises gradually become the dominant type of blockholder of listed 
companies at the time of the IPO.
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Table 9 shows the results of further testing using the IPO sample for the 1997-
2003 period. The institutional environment data of Fan et al. (2007) starts in 1997. 
To use actual institutional environment data, this paper selects 520 IPO samples for 
this period, of which 47 have blockholders that are state asset management bureaus 
aﬃliated with local governments, 407 have blockholders that are SOEs aﬃliated with 
local governments, and 66 have blockholders that are private enterprises. The market 
risk BETA data come from the data two years after the IPO, the growth indicator data 
come from the data one year after the IPO and other financial indicator data come 
from the data at the end of the year of the IPO. It is found that after controlling for 
the endogeneity between ownership concentration and blockholder characteristics, the 
eﬀects of the regional institutional environment on the privatization of listed companies 
are still signiﬁcantly positive, which provides further support for Hypothesis 4. The use 
of IPO samples in the analysis provides us with a new research perspective. With the 
development and improvement of China’s capital market, and the improvement of the 
availability of data and sample size, the tests of this issue will be more robust.
Table 8. Regional Institutional Environment and Privatization of Listed Companies Regression
Predicted
Sign
Dependent variable PRIVAT
Variables INDEXMAR INSFACTOR INDEXMAR INSFACTOR
Probit SEM Probit SEM Probit SEM Probit SEM
Intercept ? 4.892***(5.245)
2.693**
(2.238)
5.150***
(5.493)
2.984***
(2.450)
5.050***
(5.449)
3.147***
(2.648)
5.306***
(5.704)
3.439***
(2.855)
LSHARE 1
 
– -0.593***(-13.493)
-0.873***
(-4.839)
-0.594***
(-13.523)
-0.872***
(-4.840)
LHHI 5 – -0.440***(-12.628)
-0.619***
(-4.403)
-0.441***
(-12.659)
-0.618***
(-4.406)
INDEX + 0.049*(1.758)
0.052*
(1.844)
0.073
(1.462)
0.073
(1.471)
0.048*
(1.737)
0.052*
(1.872)
0.072
(1.433)
0.074
(1.488)
EAST + 0.003(0.033)
-0.084
(-0.823)
0.044
(0.468)
-0.028
(-0.305)
-0.004
(-0.047)
-0.081
(-0.793)
0.036
(0.388)
-0.024
(-0.267)
LNASS – -0.312***(-6.975)
-0.206***
(-3.637)
-0.311***
(-6.943)
-0.206***
(-3.643)
-0.340***
(-7.677)
-0.257***
(-4.968)
-0.339***
(-7.647)
-0.257***
(-4.967)
YEAR 02 ? 0.210**(2.210)
0.180*
(1.946)
0.214**
(2.258)
0.185**
(2.010)
0.221**
(2.349)
0.198**
(2.156)
0.226**
(2.398)
0.204**
(2.221)
YEAR 03 ? 0.404***(4.236)
0.344***
(3.667)
0.413***
(4.347)
0.356***
(3.815)
0.424***
(4.474)
0.379***
(4.075)
0.434***
(4.590)
0.391***
(4.229)
YEAR 04 ? 0.588***(5.888)
0.489***
(4.907)
0.599***
(5.985)
0.505***
(5.081)
0.612***
(6.171)
0.537***
(5.475)
0.624***
(6.277)
0.553***
(5.658)
INREGU – -0.191***(-2.986)
-0.104
(-1.480)
-0.190***
(-2.950)
-0.103
(-1.460)
-0.187***
(-2.938)
-0.116
(-1.636)
-0.185***
(-2.904)
-0.114
(-1.615)
Obs. 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643 2643
LRStatistic 374.19*** 209.09*** 373.16*** 207.01*** 341.46*** 204.83*** 340.41*** 202.75***
McFaddenR 2 0.138 0.077 0.138 0.076 0.126 0.076 0.126 0.075
Note: Figures in brackets are T values adjusted using the Newey-West method. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (two tailed).
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5. Sensitivity and Robustness Testing
We conduct the following sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the results.
5.1. Deletion of the Sample Observations of Listed Companies Located in Shenzhen 
and Shanghai
As Xia and Chen (2007) document, compared to other regions, the practice of the 
reform and opening up policy and the reform of SOEs in Shenzhen and Shanghai are 
rather special. In addition, as stock exchanges are located in Shenzhen and Shanghai, it is 
possible that the corporate governance structure of listed companies in these two cities is 
diﬀerent to companies in other regions. Among the 2,643 observations in this research, 
80 are in Shenzhen and 212 in Shanghai. Therefore, we delete these observations to 
ensure that the results are not solely induced by them. The main results remain the same. 
In addition, to take into account that some listed companies may be registered in one 
region but operate in another and could thereby inﬂuence the results, we exclude those 
listed companies. The results remain the same.
Table 9. Regional Institutional Environment and Privatization of Listed Companies Regression 
 (IPO Sample)
Predicted
Sign
Dependent variable PRIVAT
Variables INDEXMAR INSFACTOR INDEXMAR INSFACTOR
Probit SEM Probit SEM Probit SEM Probit SEM
Intercept ? 9.678***(3.277)
10.887***
(2.610)
10.664***
(3.662)
12.152***
(2.918)
9.249***
(3.079)
11.716***
(2.700)
10.245***
(3.474)
13.040***
(3.013)
LSHARE 1
 
– -0.444***(-4.561)
-0.079
(-0.154)
-0.448***
(-4.616)
-0.069
(-0.135)
LHHI 5 – -0.374***(-4.483)
0.028
(0.071)
-0.378***
(-4.565)
0.039
(0.097)
INDEX + 0.186*(1.808)
0.216**
(2.047)
0.276*
(1.668)
0.321*
(1.896)
0.189*
(1.817)
0.221**
(2.106)
0.281*
(1.680)
0.328*
(1.945)
EAST + -0.229(-0.789)
-0.278
(-0.981)
-0.166
(-0.601)
-0.206
(-0.757)
-0.234
(-0.806)
-0.279
(-0.984)
-0.173
(-0.625)
-0.207
(-0.762)
LNASS – -0.621***(-4.300)
-0.682***
(-3.324)
-0.615***
(-4.272)
-0.682***
(-3.340)
-0.619***
(-4.260)
0.722***
(-3.656)
-0.614***
(-4.232)
-0.723***
(-3.676)
IPOYEAR ? CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL
INREGU – 0.022(0.131)
-0.052
(-0.271)
0.033
(0.195)
-0.046
(-0.234)
0.011
(0.065)
-0.074
(-0.393)
0.022
(0.130)
-0.068
(-0.356)
Obs. 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520
LRStatistic 95.41*** 79.92*** 94.80*** 78.97*** 94.22*** 79.90*** 93.65*** 78.96***
McFaddenR 2 0.241 0.201 0.239 0.199 0.238 0.201 0.236 0.199
Note: Figures in brackets are Z values adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively (two tailed).
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5.2. Institutional Environment Data
The institutional environment data are obtained from the NERI Index of the 
Marketization of China’s Provinces: 2006 Report (Fan, Wang and Zhu, 2007) which takes 
2001 as the base year to develop relative indexes in various regions from 2001 to 2005. 
As the three indexes used in this study (marketization, government intervention and 
legal environment) are relatively stable in all years, almost all of the previous studies 
that adopt this presumption use the index of the base year. We also use this method for 
robustness testing, which can reduce the endogeneity of the institutional environment. 
The results remain unchanged.
We also use the government effectiveness index from the document ‘Government 
Governance, Investment Environment and Harmonious Society: The Enhancement of 
Competitiveness of 120 Cities in China’ issued by the World Bank (October, 2006) as a 
proxy variable of the institutional environment. The analysis shows that our main results 
remain the same. This index includes the average number of days that enterprises have 
to deal with key governmental agencies every year, the access to bank loans of small and 
medium-sized private enterprises, conﬁdence in property rights protection and contract 
rights and conﬁdence in courts. Among them, conﬁdence in property rights protection 
and contract rights and in courts concern, in essence, investor protection. 
5.3. Other Relevance Tests
As the blockholder characteristics and ownership concentration of listed companies 
do not change signiﬁcantly after their IPOs, we use companies the IPOs of which took 
place from 1997 to 2003 as samples to run regressions as in Tables 5, 6 and 7. The 
results remain unchanged.
To reduce the possible adverse inﬂuence of endogeneity between ownership structure 
and financial measures, we use financial measures of the previous year to test the 
hypotheses. We also use the accounting performance measure ROA or ROE, market 
performance measure TOBINQ or P/B (price to book value ratio) and other growth 
and market risk measures to conduct combined tests. Finally, we use annual data to run 
regressions. In each case, the results do not change.
6. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
This paper uses China’s A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2004 as the research 
sample. It investigates the influence of institutional environment variables, namely, 
the process of marketization, level of local government intervention and local legal 
environment, on the ownership structure of listed companies. It further examines 
the hypothesis that corporate governance structure is endogenously determined by 
the institutional environment. The results show that in regions where the process of 
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regional marketization is moving quickly, the level of local government intervention 
is lower and that of local legal protection is higher: (1) if the blockholders of listed 
companies are state asset management bureaus aﬃliated with local governments, then 
blockholder shareholding is higher and ownership structure is more concentrated; (2) 
if the blockholders of listed companies are SOEs affiliated with local governments, 
then blockholder shareholding is lower and ownership structure is less concentrated; 
(3) if the blockholders of listed companies are private companies, then the inﬂuence 
of the regional institutional environment on ownership concentration is insigniﬁcant; 
and (4) the degree of privatization of Chinese listed companies is higher. The ﬁndings 
indicate that the regional institutional environment aﬀects the choice of blockholder 
type and ownership concentration of listed companies. The results remain the same after 
controlling for the endogeneity problem related to institutional environment variables 
using the instrumental variable method and a series of robustness tests.
This paper extends domestic research into the endogeneity problem related to 
ownership structure. The findings help us to further understand the reasons for the 
differences in ownership concentration and blockholder characteristics in listed 
companies under diﬀerent modes of local government control in China. They indicate 
that to obtain a better understanding of the issues concerning listed companies in China, 
including governance structure, corporate performance, ﬁnancial policies and accounting 
information quality, further in-depth research into the role of the regional institutional 
environment is required. In addition, the study adds to the knowledge of the ways in 
which institutional environment factors aﬀect ownership structure within one country 
and in transitional and emerging market economies.
It should be noted that this paper studies only the cross-sectional differences 
among the ownership structures of the sample companies resulting from the inﬂuence 
of the institutional environment, and does not study directly the possible influence 
of institutional environment on the dynamic evolution of ownership structure. The 
following issues are worth further research attention: how blockholder characteristics, 
pyramid structure and ownership concentration affect each other under certain 
institutional environments, how the ownership concentration of private companies 
is determined and how the ownership structure of listed companies is dynamically 
determined following their IPOs.
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